Urban heritages: how history and housing finance matter to housing form and homeownership rates Article (Accepted Version) http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Blackwell, Timothy and Kohl, Sebastian (2018) Urban heritages: how history and housing finance matter to housing form and homeownership rates. Urban Studies, 55 (16). pp. [3669][3670][3671][3672][3673][3674][3675][3676][3677][3678][3679][3680][3681][3682][3683][3684][3685][3686][3687][3688] This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/73737/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version.
Introduction
This paper interrogates a series of simple, related questions: why do urban housing systems differ so markedly both between and within Western countries? Why have some cities historically sprawled as they developed with low-rise, single-family dwellings, as in much of North America, whilst others have taken the form of compact urban agglomerations comprised of multi-dwelling buildings, as in much of mainland Europe? Why are some cities populated predominantly by homeowners whilst, in others, tenants comprise the majority?
The significance and relevance of these questions goes beyond mere theoretical intrigue.
Indeed, the types of housing and residential urban forms a city exhibits have been shown to have considerable consequences for the modes of transport its citizens use, air quality (Newman and Kenworthy 1989) , electoral geography and unemployment rates (Blanchflower and Oswald 2013) . While geographers have conducted much cross-sectional work on city typologies, less work has been done on understanding where these different urban housing systems derive from historically. This paper aims to address this oversight.
We believe that the answers to the above questions are to be found, in part, in countries' historical urban development and, more specifically, in the role, and form, housing finance institutions played therein. Building on a novel and comprehensive database relating to nearly 1095 cities in 27 countries around 1910, we claim, first, that the development of organized systems of mortgage intermediation which emerged during the long nineteenth century is associated with either single-dwelling building cities with considerable suburbanisation, or more concentrated, multi-dwelling building cities. We claim that informal and deposit-based mortgage finance systems tended to produce the former because they offered more localised and democratized modes of finance with mortgages in smaller tranches (and with generous loan-to-value ratios), whereas more centralised and financially integrated bond-based urban housing finance systems tended to produce the latter city type. Whilst our story concerns the formation of modern Western cities during the large urbanization waves of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, our second claim is that these historically couched differences in urban form also bear influence on today's Western cities, with certain caveats regarding path-breaking cities. Our argument, in essence, is that housing finance played an important conditioning and differentiating role in the developmental trajectories of Western cities during the late nineteenth century and that these legacies are still visible in the heterogeneous residential urban forms and tenure composition that Western cities display today.
The paper makes a contribution to the growing body of literature on historical persistence (Nunn 2014) and path dependence which has recently also been applied to urban and housing system development (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2010, Meen et al. 2016) . What unites these works and ours is the conviction that the period of urbanization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries represents a critical juncture for many Western cities. This was a formative period in which the historically differentiated systems of housing and finance provision in different countries, regions and cities throughout the West, left enduring institutional legacies which can go some way in helping to account for cross-national and cross-regional differences in urban form and tenure composition to this day.
The paper also enriches cross-sectional studies of international or intranational variation with regard to homeownership and housing structures (Lerbs and Oberst 2012, Lauridsen, Nannerup, and Skak 2009 ) in order to demonstrate the importance of historical lineages vis-à-vis housing and the built environment. Bo Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara (2010: 193) note that, "A housing stock produced during several decades, sometimes hundreds of years, of building activity creates a powerful historical heritage", yet, while the cross-sectional studies identify socio-economic, demographic, transportation or political factors in order to explain higher rates of homeownership, prices, or the incidence of single-family dwellings, they often neglect the long-term impact of urban developments which are beyond the purview of one generation's influence.
Finally, we contribute to the understanding of comparative housing system analysis by disaggregating the almost exclusively national comparisons, which so often gloss over considerable intra-country heterogeneity. By including cities in our multilevel analysis, we move closer to the markets in which housing is financed, produced and consumed, whilst not losing sight of macro-and socio-economic conditions. Our analysis reveals that, contrary to widely held scholarly belief, residential urban form and tenure composition are not so much linked to countries' respective welfare systems or varieties of capitalism (Hoekstra 2005 , Kemeny 1981 , but more to intricacies that lie in urban history and housing finance system development.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section engages with urban and housing studies literature, whilst the second section interrogates how and why, during the major urbanization waves between 1850-1914, Western cities developed so differently. In order to explain this heterogeneity, housing finance institutions are presented as the central differentiating variable.
The last section analyses the heritages of these city and financial structures by showing that pre-1914 urban housing densities still have an impact on contemporary urban residential housing form and tenure composition in Western cities.
Literature
The focus, scope and disciplinary orientation of mainstream comparative housing research differs markedly, as one might expect. Nevertheless, whether exploring national differences in policy frameworks and the impacts of these on relative levels of homeownership (Kemeny, 1995) , on the one hand, or analysing house prices and rents over time (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2017) on the other, what unites these studies is the fact that their foci is typically at the national level; which, as our analysis shows later, can be problematic. (Kemeny 2005) . However, given the manifest internal country heterogeneity, and the locally fixed nature of housing, such methodological nationalism inherent in the aforementioned scholarly contributions is problematic if it cannot determine how much of the internationally observed variance is really due to national, and not local housing differences.
In more geographically and econometrically leaning literature, differences in housing and the built environment are much more likely to be explained at the level of contemporary regions or cities, mostly by using a set of cities within countries and adding a range of sociodemographic and economic variables into a (spatial) regression in order to account for observed variation. These studies have found homeownership to be higher in more urbanized settings, with older populations, better price-to-rent ratios, older building stock, higher average incomes and household size, better credit access conditions, higher Catholic populations, and higher unemployment rates (Lerbs and Oberst 2012, Lauridsen, Nannerup, and Skak 2009). Even though many of these studies produce high values of explained variance, an evident shortcoming with such approaches is the static cross-sectional nature of enquiry, which is applied to objects that have often over a century-long history. Urban and regional systems, as well as housing, both across and within certain cities, have been shown to follow strongly path dependent developmental trajectories (Kohl 2016 , Meen et al. 2016 ; the methodological application of static cross-sectional comparisons, then, can only reveal so much. Such studies, therefore, neglect an important dimension: urban history.
In historical geography and urban sociolog it is common to distinguish different city types, often with regional scopes, that are characterized by clusters of features. This tradition reaches back to Max Weber and Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, who both juxtaposed the Western city with its historical tradition of bourgeois self-government, to the more administered cities of the Oriental and Asian Empires. Since these insights, the European -or Western European city -has been characterized by a multitude of specific features such as the dominance of the city centre, public transport, self-government and strong municipal autonomy (White 1984).
In the sphere of housing and the built environment, European cities have generally been characterised by their high tenant populations -both private and social -and by the predominance of multi-dwelling buildings; in contrast to the cities populated by homeowners and built in single-family dwelling form throughout much of North and Latin America.
The phenomenon of tenant inhabited multi-dwelling buildings is not novel, but can be traced back to antiquity (Mumford 1979) . As population growth accelerated rapidly in Europe during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many continental cities expanded in the form of multi-dwelling rental buildings. This peculiar form of continental European cities was also exported into colonies, where port cities were often segregated into a European higherrise cities of solid building materials (as in New York) and a low-rise native part.
Traditionally, in the Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, Russian, Balkan and Latin American city, low-rise constructions of single-family dwellings -not uncommonly owner-occupied -were the predominant form of dwelling arrangement (Pinol and Walter 2003) .
Studies which focus on the typological features of cities often do so very descriptively; rarely do they explain where different city types come from to begin with. Moreover, they tend to neglect a crucial factor behind city expansion in general, and the multi-dwelling building form in particular: the considerable capital resource mobilisation needed to undertake such enterprises. Whilst in earlier times, state or religious institutions with networks of private bankers backed the erection of high-rise buildings and city expansion, nineteenth century city expansions were, to greater or less degrees, organized and financed by private, non-state actors. This, we argue, is when differentiated systems of urban housing finance provision really began to matter for urban form in the West.
More contemporary literature has emphasized the impact of contemporary financial formations on cities and housing patterns, including contributions to this journal (Stephens 2003) . There are also accounts of form following finance where the emergence and proliferation of capital intensive skyscrapers were often preceded by innovations in finance (Willis 1995) . Skyscrapers have even become tools for predicting financial stock-market returns (Löffler 2013) and macroeconomic forecasting. Mian and Sufi (Mian and Sufi 2016) have demonstrated that the zip-code areas where subprime mortgage lending proliferated most prior to 2007, were the same areas which experienced higher incidences of foreclosure and greater house price depreciation during the ensuing Great Recession. What these works demonstrate is how finance's incessant profit-seeking, and ostensive risk aversion to the impacts of falling prices, have all helped to shaped the very development of our cities, both historically and contemporarily.
The link between housing finance institution type and housing form and tenure is central to our analysis below. In order to understand why Western cities exhibit such diversity in terms of housing form and tenure composition, we have a rich body of literature that is countrycomparative in the case of the field of housing studies, or subnational and cross-sectional in the case of urban socio-economic and urban geography scholarship. In relation to the latter, this research often provides broadly descriptive historical narratives, with little explanatory power to account for the variety of outcomes brought about by the single historical process of industrial urbanization. We now attempt to draw inspiration from each of these strands of literature by showing how the historical housing finance tradition in countries and regions has produced historically different city types. To support this analysis we use data for 1095 cities nested within 27 countries around 1910 to show how differences which emerged during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries left path-dependent legacies which still bear influence on the differential building form and tenure composition in Western cities today.
Historical urban building form and housing finance
In a previous study, the authors (forthcoming) have suggested a historically informed typology of different housing finance systems, which we superficially noted appear to correlate with specific types of housing system. Our study notes that, while Anglo-Saxon and North Western European countries tended to develop mortgage institutions reliant on the collection of deposits (deposit-based) in order to originate mortgages (such as building societies, savings and loans associations or savings banks) during their rural-urban transitions, central and Northern European countries developed bond emitting (bond-based) urban mortgage banks (functionally adapted from the earlier agrarian mortgage banks) to fund their urban expansions, with varying degrees of state assistance. The housing finance systems in Southern Europe, as in developing countries today, were more characterised by a prevalence of informal networks of lending, outside of institutionalised banking circuits, but as the twentieth century wore on these countries too tended to develop predominantly deposit-based housing finance systems in order to fund their urban expansions.
As this study was more concerned with the origins of housing finance systems and how housing finance system heterogeneity can be historically accounted for with reference to capital mobilisation imperatives, we left the possibility that differences in housing finance composition could have a bearing on urban housing form empirically unchecked. Our core contention in this paper is that the constitution of housing finance, and how it is intermediated, matters to housing form, and our aim is to investigate this association empirically. Based on historical evidence for each country (see appendix 3 for countryspecific sources), we propose that the deposit-based and informal housing finance systems were more likely to construct single-family dwelling cities, more conducive to owneroccupation, whilst the bond-based housing finance systems tended to produce compact cities of multi-dwelling buildings, occupied by tenants.
The mechanism behind these linkages between, on the one hand, bond-based mortgage finance and multi-dwelling building construction and, on the other, deposit-based housing finance institutions and single-dwelling building erection is twofold. First, bond-based mortgage banks were able to tap into large reserves of capital by selling bonds on capital markets, and benefit from economies of scale when originating the larger mortgages necessitated by larger multi-dwelling building projects. This contrasted with the smaller and localized branch networks of the mutual building societies and savings banks which, whilst increasingly less localised as the twentieth century wore on, still relied on members' deposits in order to originate mortgages (i.e. borrowing short-term in the form of deposits in order to be able to originate mortgages over the longer-term). These deposit-based institutions also tended to have generous LTV ratios when compared to the larger institutional bond-emitting mortgage originators, which made this form of institutional lending more conducive to prospective owner occupiers (Rodger 2001: 272) .
Second, the bond-based mortgage banks (mainly situated in central cities) were confronted with information asymmetries in contrast to the more established informal or mutualist/savings-banks branch networks that were more locally embedded. Mortgage banks, thus, preferred collateral that was easier to monitor, was more standardized, and was capable of generating stable rental income.
By the WWI, cities throughout the industrializing world had subsumed considerable waves of rural migrants and had developed much of the institutional apparatus for maintaining urban transport networks, waterworks, sewage systems, and electricity and gas infrastructure that we recognise today. Both in terms of population, built-up areas and residential housing, cities throughout Europe witnessed considerable expansions. Whilst cities were expanding everywhere, they did not do so homogeneously. Different city forms were emerging which would pique the interest of housing observers and reformers. One such reformer, the German 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 economist and city planner Rudolf Eberstadt, noted that, the further east one travelled in Europe, the more likely one was to see higher population and building densities (Eberstadt 1920 At a time when housing statistics were in their infancy, reformers often relied on recording the ratio of persons per building (as opposed to dwelling or household) in a city and we found this metric to be the most comprehensive and harmonizable comparative measure in the housing census material of the 27 different countries we surveyed (see detailed sources in appendix 1). The metric is convenient firstly because it approximates the size of the building needed, on average, to house a city's residents, with higher-storey buildings producing a higher ratio than single-dwelling buildings. Secondly, as less area is generally needed for multi-storey buildings, the metric implicitly approximates the extent of urban sprawl. Thirdly, as apartment ownership was not very common prior to the inter-War years in Europe, this metric is also able to approximate the rate of homeownership: generally speaking, then, the higher the number of persons per building, the lower the incidence of homeownership. This metric is by no means perfect. The inference that a higher ratio of persons per building implies more rented multi-dwelling buildings can be distorted by unequal distributions of vacancies and overcrowding, for instance. Robustness tests with alternative measures, however, and the widespread use of this metric among historical housing reformers means that we are fairly confident about the robustness of this measure (see appendix 1).
Using this scale, and disregarding outliers, the lower quartile within our unique sample contains cities with ratios of between 4-5 persons per building. With a median value of 8.8, we take this first half of cities to represent the single-family dwelling type because, with a family sizes larger than the contemporary nuclear family, this number averages (roughly) one family per house. The third quartile reaches 15 persons per building which we take to approximate the traditional multi-story city with everything beyond this indicative of cities Using the complete 1095 cities, a null model on persons per building with cities nested within 27 countries 1 from 1914 finds that 32.5 per cent of variance is at the country level, while the majority is due to city-level variation.
We successively fill up the null model first with the country-level variable -measuring bond circulation in a first model. In a second model, we add the city-level variable "mortgage bank presence" (Yes/No) which measures more adequately the city-specific effects of mortgage bonds. We further control for city population around 1910 because larger cities -although not uniformly -generally have a higher proportion of multi-dwelling buildings. In a third model specification, we add lagged historical variables from the year 1800 by merging our data with existing collections (Dincecco and Onorato 2016). We believe this is necessary, as it can quite convincingly be argued that pre-existing historical conditions, rather than the emergence of bond-issuing mortgage banks in the nineteenth century set cities on different trajectories. As big cities usually attracted more absolute, and even relative, population growth, it could be the case that it was the initial size of the city before the rapid urbanizations of the nineteenth century that attracted mortgage banks to finance city expansion. We therefore control for the population size in 1800 and a range of structural historical measures which could explain why cities in 1910 could have higher numbers of persons per building, such as their function as a capital, a bishop-seat, a university city, and whether they historically had free city status.
Invariant variables such as the elevation, sea or river location were found to be insignificant and therefore excluded. These variables make most sense for 398 available cities in 17
European countries, with a bias towards the bigger cities by 1910 with a longer historical past (Model 3).
In a final fourth model, we test whether our mortgage history explanation holds when controlled for a rival explanation to account for high-rise cities: the presence of a defensive city wall. Non-continental and peripheral northern European cities either went unfortified or lost their city walls very early on, which, the city wall hypothesis maintains, allowed such cities to grow horizontally. Continental European cities with enceintes, on the other hand, tended to grow vertically according to this logic. As far as we are aware, no research has systematically interrogated this association, but there are implicit articulations in much urban studies literature (Weber 1995: 67) . As intuitive as it may first appears, the city wall explanation has problems accounting for the highly fortified, though low-rise, Dutch and Belgian cities or the weakly fortified, though moderately high-rise, Scandinavian ones. As Adding the bond variable lessens the country-level variation in comparison to the null model. It increases the model's fit and produces a significant positive effect, although one that is low in magnitude. Adding the contemporary population size and the mortgage-bank dummy variable on the city level both increases the model fit and shows a significant effect, but leaves the bond-effect intact. The presence of mortgage banks in cities is conditionally associated with a higher number of persons per building by 5.6. Model 3 for the European continent only adds the lagged historical variables: the more a city historically relied on the function of being a capital, university, bishop's seat or free city, the more likely it was to have a higher incidence of multi-dwelling buildings by 1910. While together these additional citylevel variables make the country-level bond variable insignificant, they leave the city-based mortgage-bank variable significant and positive. Thus bond circulation in a country is not conditionally associated with the overall level of multi-dwelling urban buildings at a country level, but only with cities in the purview of mortgage banks. While the city-based variables lower the residual city-level variance, the country-level bond variable leaves the countryspecific variance almost untouched. The fourth model tests the mortgage-bank influence in light of the competing city-wall explanation: while later defortification has indeed a positive, though small effect on city density by 1910, the effect of present mortgage banks remains 2 See appendix 2 for sources. intact. Higher exposure to bonds is conditionally associated with cities higher rise-buildings after nation's first large urbanization waves, even when controlling for the two rival explanations: city walls and more historical background factors.
To be clear, we find a conditional association but we cannot claim that bond-based mortgage banks were necessary for the development of high-rise, multi-dwelling building cities during the long nineteenth century because there are obvious counterexamples as, for example, Edinburgh or Glasgow, where tenements proliferated during the late nineteenth century without the assistance of bond-based mortgage banks. The explanation for this lies in the dominance of Trusts and Life insurance companies within these localities (Rodger, 2001) . In expansion. These securities, unlike the European system of mortgage banking, were solely private, off balance sheet, and burgeoned largely free from regulatory oversight. Thus, they were quite distinct from the Federal Farm Loan system of the previous decades, which were more akin to the European bond-based system of mortgage lending (Snowden 2010).
Long-term effects of historical finance and urban form today
The previous section established that the local presence of mortgage banks is associated with To approximate the impact of historical building form on contemporary cities' housing forms and homeownership rates, we connect our 1910 data to contemporary homeownership averages of cities, narrowly defined as the administrative cities, using the harmonized Eurostat urban data for Europe and adding the city -not metropolitan -data for Canada, the USA and Sweden. Most cities in the sample have grown in area and population and are therefore not geographically identical. We use this, however, to put our claim about historical influences to a stricter test: if we find an association with urban history, then we can confidently say that it even holds in spite of a further 100 years of urban development. A first consequence of a city's housing past can be found in the significant and strong negative correlation of -0.57 of its historical building density and its current single-family house share. Current homeownership, by contrast, is not significantly associated with historical persons per building in the complete sample, but with country-group-specific differences. As the countryspecific regression lines in Figure 2 indicate, Western-European and Anglo-Saxon countries show a significant negative association of historical building density and current homeownership rates, whereas Southern, Eastern and some Northern European countries display no association at all. In the latter countries' cities, owner-occupied flats of various legal forms constituted a third form of urban housing in addition to the opposition of owneroccupied single-family-house cities and rental-flat cities. To test this bivariate relationship in a multivariate, multilevel context, we draw on averaged homeownership rates for existing data between 1990-2015, for reasons of data availability and to estimate a between-effect panel model -as we are mostly interested in structural differences. As these measures change only gradually with low volatility, averaging is not too distortive. When cities were incorporated into larger ones, we took the larger contemporary 3 European cities only, Italy and Hungary excluded due to data irregularities. city average as a modern equivalent, leaving us with a sample of 499 cities nested within 30
countries. For robustness, we also collected the metropolitan Eurostat data, but as there is a 0.94 and 0.89 correlation between the urban and metropolitan homeownership and singlefamily-house rates, respectively, we only report results for the city-level analysis below.
Using the homeownership rate in cities as a dependent variable is limited, but as extreme values are hardly realized -most falling between the 30-80 per cent range -an OLS estimation is used.
A null multilevel model on cities homeownership rate averages reveals that now 70 per cent of the variance plays out at the country-and the remainder on the city level. In a first model specification, we add the lagged building variable from 1910 and find a significant negative influence: one additional person per building in 1910 is associated with a by 0.129 percentage points higher homeownership rate. In a second model we add the two mortgage regime variables, bond circulation per capita at the country-level and mortgage bank presence at the city level. We also control for the historical city population and find general homeownership decreasing effects through all three channels of historical influence: the higher the population, bond circulation and inhabitants per building in European cities 100 years ago, the lower their homeownership rates today. In a simple linear-regression model (not shown), these three variables alone explain 62 per cent of the overall variance (80 per cent including country fixed-effects). In the third model, we add the social expenditure per GDP as a welfare state proxy 4 , in line with the welfare regime housing typologies which make this a major nationallevel variable. Notably, it turns out to be without significant effect on cities homeownership rate or the overall model. A final model, controlling for the specific developments in postSoviet countries, confirms the results. 
1990-2015)
While a broad association between building and finance history and contemporary urban building stock and homeownership can be observed, the magnitude of the homeownership effects are rather small and very country-specific, hiding different historical trajectories of which we can empirically trace three different types: suburbanization in owner-occupied 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 single-family houses, the extension of horizontal ownership in form of cooperatives or condominiums and the conversion of existing public or private dwellings in homeownership forms. While cities' homeownership rates are higher nowadays than across the last century almost without exception, their levels and trajectories are quite country-specific as Figure 3 shows: US, Canadian and German cities have seen a gradual and slow increase in homeownership rates, with initial level differences hardly changing. The distinction between cities and suburbs (or urban Eurostat regions) allows tracing processes of owner-occupied suburbanization: Bremen's homeownership rate, throughout one of the highest among German cities, is even higher once the suburbanized region is included and the difference is even larger for North American cities such as Montreal. 
Conclusion
This paper has argued the need look at patterns of residential urban development and growth which took place over a century ago in order to understand the differences in contemporary
Western cities we observe today. Using a comprehensive dataset, we discover a bifurcation of different city-types vis-à-vis housing forms. Northwest European and peripheral cities tend to consist of predominantly low-rise single-family dwellings, whereas central and northern
European cities contain much more in the way of multi-dwelling buildings. We argued that 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 housing finance institutions, which proliferated throughout the nineteenth century and beyond, played an important role in shaping city extensions and reconstructions during this era of industrial urbanisation.
We found that the historical building density that we measured through the persons per building metric around 1910 is associated with contemporary urban single-family dwelling and homeownership rates: the more a city developed multi-dwelling buildings in the nineteenth century, the lower the single-family dwelling and homeownership rate today.
However, the prediction of today's urban homeownership rates with the historical building form produces quite some systematic outliers, namely certain Scandinavian, southern What explains the observed path dependence in housing and the built environment in Western cities? One first mechanism operates through the path dependent development of financial institutions themselves: once bond-based mortgage banks arose in a country, they tended to defend their market share against newcomers and continued to make up a share of the mortgage market that was mostly tied to the financing of larger rental buildings; until the 1970s, when financial liberalization eroded many specialized mortgage circuits (Ball 1990 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 and thus maintain a high regional homeownership rate (Petrowsky 1993); once infrastructures such as an extended public transport system are built, they are likely to hold cities together in a more compact form.
Finally, our research has posed a challenge to established typological categories in the fields of housing research and comparative political economy, which are often centred at the national level and which treat private homeownership as the diametric opposite of public welfare. Our multi-level analysis delineates both historical and contemporary cities and provides both state-and city-level comparisons: while historically up to two thirds of the variance played out at the city level, it is still about one third even for today's urban homeownership rates. This speaks in favour of an analysis that goes below the national level.
While we are not in principle against sub-city-level analyses as proposed by Meen et al.
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